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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
William H. Timbers*
and
David A. Wirth**
INTRODUCTION
Two recent Supreme Court cases, California v. Sierra Club' and
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 2
illustrate the increasing importance of private rights of action in en-
vironmental litigation. The decisions, however, have created diffi-
culty in the area of judicial review. It is tempting to apply the
Supreme Court's analysis of the private rights issue in these two
cases to suits seeking judicial review of administrative action, partic-
ularly in environmental cases. This Article emphasizes the impor-
tance of maintaining a clear conceptual distinction between a private
right of action and an action seeking judicial review. The Article
then demonstrates that the analysis of the private rights question in
California v. Sierra Club and Sea Clammers does not apply to suits to
obtain judicial review of administrative action.
I
CAUSES OF ACTION BASED ON FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS
Suits to secure judicial review of administrative action and
those pursuing private rights of action are commonly employed in
litigation relying on the federal environmental laws.3 Because pri-
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
This article is based on a speech delivered by Judge Timbers to the American Law Insti-
tute-American Bar Association Course of Study on Environmental Law on February 18,
1982, in Washington, D.C.
** Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State.
The views presented in this article are those of the authors and do not represent
positions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit or the United
States Department of State.
1 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
2 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
3 A number of federal statutes address primarily environmental matters. See, e.g.,
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-36y (1982); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1982); Marine Mammal Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
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vate parties can initiate both types of action, the labels used to de-
scribe those actions may create confusion. To avoid this problem,
the following two sections will describe the fundamental elements of
the two kinds of action.4
A. Private Rights of Action
This Article defines a private right of action under a substantive
regulatory statute as a private party's action to enforce a regulatory
standard. 5 This definition does not confine a private right of action
to any class of defendant or to any form of relief. There is, however,
the presupposition of a valid and enforceable regulatory norm. Be-
cause of this assumption, a private right of action might better be
termed a "citizen enforcement action."'6 Promoting the purpose of
a statute through citizen initiative is an important policy goal behind
a private right of action.7
1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-34 (1982), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-45 (1982); Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1982); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1982); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-10 (1982); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-18
(1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982).
Other federal statutes whose primary purpose is not to remedy or prevent environ-
mental problems also have substantial environmental components. See, e.g., Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56, 1801-66 (1982) (purpose is to permit
offshore resource development in a manner consistent with environmental considera-
tions). This discussion, moreover, is not confined to legislation with an environmental
content but could apply to any substantive regulatory statute.
4 This Article assumes that all suits are brought in federal court relying solely on
federal statutes. The analysis could, however, be extended to other situations.
5 SeeJ. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYS-
TEM 82 (1975).
6 The term "private right of action" as applied to a substantive regulatory statute
appears to have developed in the context of a distinction between governmental and
private enforcement of regulatory standards. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426, 431-32 (1964) (recognizing private right of action for violation of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 even though statute did not provide expressly for private relief).
The discussion in this Article, by contrast, involves a distinction among actions that pri-
vate parties may commence. Consequently, the word "private" in this context may be
misleading.
7 See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3231 (1983)("If
[a plaintiff] obtains an injunction [under title VI], he does so not for himself alone but
also as a 'private attorney general', vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority.") (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02
(1968));J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (implication of private right of
action under § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 necessary "to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose"); Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) ("citizen groups are. . . to be treated
...as welcomed participants in the vindication of environmental interests" under citi-
404 [Vol. 70:403
1985] PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 405
Private rights of action under substantive federal regulatory
statutes can be express or implied. Express private rights of action
appear in "citizen suit" provisions in a substantial number of federal
environmental laws.8 A typical citizen suit provision authorizes any
zen suit provision creating express private right of action for enforcement of Clean Air
Act); S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3668, 3747 ("The Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions
under [citizen suit provision creating express private right of action for enforcement of
Federal Water Pollution Control Act] citizens would be performing a public ser-
vice .... "); S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in relevant part in Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (same remark
with respect to citizen suit provision creating express private right of action for enforce-
ment of Clean Air Act); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct, 90 YALE LJ. 1, 61 & n.235 (1980) (The provision of "an additional source of
discipline of management misconduct. . . that reaps no revenues for the public coffers,
but at least needs no public funds to implement" is a "traditional justification for im-
plied causes of action."); Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmoni-
zation Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DUKE LJ. 928, 929 n.2 (doctrine of implied private
action has been justified as means of effectuating purposes of legislation); Note, Implying
Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 291 (1963) (recogniz-
ing argument that "implying a cause of action may increase the likelihood of compliance
with [a] statute by giving victims incentive to assist in its enforcement").
8 E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a)(1) (1982);
Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 11 (g)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1982); Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 520(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(1)
(1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g)(1), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(g)(1) (1982); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, § 16(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1)
(1982); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(1) (1982); Noise
Control Act of 1972, § 12(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (a)(1) (1982); Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976, § 7002(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1982); Clean Air Act
§ 304(a)(1) & (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) & (3) (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act § 23(a)(1), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1) (1982). The Clean Air Act contains the first citi-
zen suit provision and is the model for the rest.
and is the model for the rest.
A second clause of the typical citizen suit provision creates a cause of action to
compel the federal official responsible for implementing the statute to perform a nondis-
cretionary act or duty. E.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 20(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2619(a)(2) (1982); Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 11(g)(1)(B) & (C), 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(l)(B) & (C) (1982); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
§ 520(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2) (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
§ 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, § 16(a)(2), 33
U.S.C. § 1515(a)(2) (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
8(a)(2) (1982); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a)(2) (1982);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, § 7 002(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)
(1982); Clean Air Act § 304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982).
Actions created by these clauses to compel federal officials to perform nondiscre-
tionary acts or duties are analytically distinct from private rights of action as defined
above. These statutorily created actions are better discussed under theories of judicial
review, see Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982) ("review-
ing court shall. . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed")
[hereinafter cited as APA], or mandamus, see Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (1982) ("action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or em-
ployee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plain-
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person to commence a civil action on his own behalf against any
person, including the United States or a government agency, to en-
force the statute, regulations promulgated under its authority, or
other requirements contemplated by the statutory scheme, such as
permits or administrative orders.
The Supreme Court recently has decided a significant number
of cases in which parties have asserted implied private rights of ac-
tion under various federal statutes. 9 Courts scrutinize congressional
intent in determining whether an implied private right of action ex-
ists under a substantive regulatory statute.10 Examining additional
tiff"). See also Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (3d Cir.
1984) (equating purposes of APA § 10(e)(1) and mandamus portion of Federal Water
Pollution Control Act citizen suit provision). See generallyJ. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra
note 5, at 891 (characterizing action to compel official to perform his duty as general
mandamus action and noting that its primary value may be jurisdictional). Cf. Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that
Federal Water Pollution Control Act citizen suit provision "may add little to the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts as a practical matter"). See infra note 14 (discussing Mandamus
and Venue Act of 1962).
9 E.g., Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984) (no implied private right of
action for investment company under § 36(b) of Investment Company Act of 1940);
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3227-32 (1983) (implied pri-
vate right of action found in title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388-95 (1982) (implied private cause of
action under Commodity Exchange Act as amended by Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639-40
(1981) (Sherman and Clayton Acts do not explicitly or implicitly create a right to contri-
bution among co-conspirators); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451
U.S. 77, 86-95 (1981) (no implied right to contribution against co-violator of Equal Pay
Act of 1963 and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Universities Research Ass'n v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 771-73 (1981) (no implied private right of action for back wages
under Davis-Bacon Act where government contract does not contain prevailing wage
stipulations); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979)
(implied private right of action exists under § 215 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 to void a contract made in violation of that act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 568-76 (1979) (no implied private right of action under § 17(a) of Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689-709
(1979) (implied private right of action exists under title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977) (no private cause
of action under rule lOb-5 of SEC Rules and § 10(b),of Securities Exchange Act of 1934
where disputed appraisal of stock for purposes of merger did not involve manipulation
or deception); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1977) (no implied private
cause of action under circumstances of tender offer under § 14(e) of Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-206 (1976) (no
private cause of action under rule lOb-5 of SEC rules and § 10(b) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 where no allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud).
10 See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) ("[The]
focus ... in any case involving the implication of a right of action ... is on the intent
of Congress."); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981)
("whether a statute creates a private right of action is ultimately [a question] 'of congres-
sional intent' "); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16
(1979) ("The question whether a statute creates [an implied cause of action] is basically
a matter of statutory construction.") (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
406 [Vol. 70:403
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factors also may help a court ascertain the existence of a private
remedy. I 1
B. Judicial Review of Administrative Action
Judicial review of administrative action provides an opportunity
to contest the legality or adequacy of governmental action imple-
menting a regulatory statute through a comparison of official con-
duct in a particular case with specified legal standards.' 2 Many
environmental statutes contain their own provisions authorizing ju-
dicial review.' 3 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)14 provides
additional assurance that final federal agency action, with certain
U.S. 560, 568 (1979)); see also Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77, 91 (1981) ("The ultimate question . . . is whether Congress intended to create [a]
private remedy ....").
11 A unanimous Court revised the approach to the implied private rights question
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Court articulated four factors relevant to the
existence of an implied private right of action: (1) whether the plaintiff is a special bene-
ficiary of the statute; (2) whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action;
(3) whether a private remedy is consistent with the purpose of the statute; and (4)
whether and to what extent the right and remedy are traditionally covered by state law.
Id. at 78. The Court has since made clear that legislative intent is the most important
factor. See cases cited supra note 10. See also Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforce-
ment of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1982). Sunstein characterizes the Court's
current approach as follows: "[U]nless the language or history of [a] statute indicates an
affirmative intent on the part of Congress to create [private rights], the courts will not
recognize them." Id. at 413. In Sunstein's view, "the Supreme Court has. . . effectively
abandon[ed] the approach of Borak and Cort." Id.
For a discussion of the pre-Cort law of implied private rights of action, see generally
Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and Asv Some Implications for Implication,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975).
12 See, e.g., Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) ("Congress established
courts to adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual
rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized
administrative power."); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
465 F.2d 519, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (in proceeding for review of FCC order, "[i]t is the
• ..task of [a] court to undertake a careful and deliberate scrutiny of an agency's deci-
sion to insure compliance with law and the legislative mandate." (footnote omitted));
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform
of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 387,
395 (1970) (judicial review "rests on the premise ...that courts can make a useful
contribution to administration by testing the legality of official action which adversely
affects private persons"); NoteJudicial Review of Agency Inaction, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 627,
627 (1983) ('"Judicial review provides, and has always provided, vital legitimacy to ac-
tions of administrative agencies in the American system of government.").
'3 E.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act § 16, 7 U.S.C. § 136n
(1982); Toxic Substances Control Act § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 2618 (1982); Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 526, 30 U.S.C. § 1276 (1982); Deepwater Port
Act of 1974, § 17, 33 U.S.C. § 1516 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 509,
33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1448, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7 (1982);
Noise Control Act of 1972, § 16, 42 U.S.C. § 4915 (1982); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976, § 7006, 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (1982); Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607 (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
1985] 407
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limited exceptions, will be reviewable in the federal courts.1 5
Act of 1980, § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1982); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 23,
43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1982).
Several of these provisions create jurisdiction in the courts of appeals through a
petition for review. The general rule is that "[i]f. . .there exists a special statutory
review procedure, it is ordinarily supposed that Congress intended that procedure to be
the exclusive means of obtaining judicial review in those cases to which it applies." City
of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See APA § 10(b), 5 U.S.C.
§ 703 (1982) ("The form of proceeding forjudicial review is the special statutory review
proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the ab-
sence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action, including actions for
declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or mandatory injunction ...."). Cf. Al-
legheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that mandamus portion of citizen suit provision of Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1982), precludes reliance on APA action to compel federal offi-
cial to perform mandatory duty).
Confusion has sometimes arisen in dealing with statutes that provide for jurisdic-
tion in the courts of appeals over proceedings to obtain judicial review and jurisdiction
in the district courts over citizen suits, especially those seeking to compel performance
of a nondiscretionary duty. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. EPA, 618 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1980)
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction petition for review under Federal Water Pollution
Control Act characterized by court as alleging administrative inaction); Environmental
Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 90-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (same). See generally Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (discussing juris-
dictional distinction under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976); Council
of Commuter Orgs. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 683 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir. 1982)
(same under Clean Air Act); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1274
n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same under Toxic Substances Control Act); Sun Enters. v. Train,
532 F.2d 280, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1976) (same under Federal Water Pollution Control Act);
Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654, 661-62 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(same under Clean Air Act); Currie, Judicial Review under the Federal Pollution Laws, 62
IOwA L. REV. 1221 (1977) (arguing that district court jurisdiction should exist when
rulemaking proceeding has not occurred and appeals court jurisdiction should exist
when proceeding has occurred). See generally NoteJurisdiction to Review Federal Administra-
tive Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 980 (1975) (discussing courts
of appeals and district courts as alternative forums ofjudicial review and ways of reduc-
ing uncertainty as to the correct forum).
14 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982). Although the APA does not indepen-
dently create jurisdiction in the federal courts, see Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99
(1977), the elimination of the threshold amount in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), conferring
federal question jurisdiction on the district courts, means that "the appropriate district court
always has jurisdiction to review any reviewable action of afederal agency unless a specific statute is
interpreted to withdraw the jurisdiction conferred on the district court by § 1331." 4 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 23.3 (2d ed. 1983) (emphasis in original).
The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982), provides an alter-
native form of review in district courts through an action in the nature of mandamus. See
generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatu-
tory "Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967) (discuss-
ing relationship of § 1361 to other statutes involved in nonstatutory judicial review
actions and arguing that availability and scope of nonstatutory review should be gov-
erned by equitable rather than mandamus principles).
15 APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 704 (1982) (final agency action reviewable unless
precluded by statute or committed to agency discretion). The question of reviewability
should in principle be distinguished from the standing requirement. See Barlow v. Col-
lins, 397 U.S. 159, 176 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result and dissenting).
Likewise, questions as to the existence of a private right of action should be conceptually
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To facilitate the salutary purpose of such suits, courts have es-
tablished a presumption of reviewability in cases seeking judicial re-
view of administrative action.' 6 This differs from the treatment of
an implied private right of action, the existence of which must be
affirmatively demonstrated.' 7 Although both forms of suit involve
policy considerations based on public benefit from private initia-
tive, 18 potential defendants in an action to secure judicial review
under the federal environmental laws, unlike those available under a
private right of action for enforcement, can only be the federal gov-
ernment or one of its agencies or officials.' 9
A private right of action is a necessary prerequisite to enforcing
separate from the standing inquiry. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 & n.18
(1979). These distinctions, however, have not been uniformly observed, and the ques-
tion of the existence of a private right of action or an action for judicial review has
affected the standing analysis in some cases. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-
01 (1975) ("standing ... often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted");
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 456
(1974) ("it is only if [an implied cause of action] exists that we need consider whether
the respondent had standing"). See generally Garvey, A Litigation Primerfor Standing Dismis-
sals, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 545, 565 (1980) (existence of private right of action as element of
standing); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discre-
lion," 83 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1968) (reviewability implicated by standing analysis);
Tushnet, The New Law of Standing. A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 673
(1977) ("The [Supreme] Court has never clearly recognized the relationship between
standing cases and 'private right of action' cases.").
16 E.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104 (1977) (discussing "Congress' inten-
tion and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the
actions of federal administrative officials"); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567
(1975) ("strong presumption" favoring judicial review); Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397
U.S. 598, 606 (1970) ("we start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain
Uudicial] review") (citing City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 164 (1969));
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967) (APA's "generous review
provisions"); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 587 F.2d 549, 555 (2d Cir.
1978) (judicial review should be foreclosed only on explicit showing of contrary legisla-
tive intent).
17 See supra notes 9-11 (citing cases).
18 See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970) (characterizing plaintiff injudicial review proceeding as "private attorney general
to litigate the issues of the public interest"); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) ("[T]here is nothing constitutionally
prohibiting Congress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a pro-
ceeding [to prevent action by official in violation of statutory powers], even if the sole
purpose is to vindicate the public interest."). Cf supra note 7 and accompanying text
(public benefit from citizen enforcement).
19 See, e.g., APA §§ 10(a) & (b), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1982) (establishing right of
review of agency action and form and venue of proceeding). Unlike some private rights
of action, money damages are not available as a remedy in a suit to obtain judicial review
under the APA. Id. § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702. As a general matter, damages are not avail-
able under citizen suit provisions. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 17 n.27. But see Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 520(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1270(0 (expressly
authorizing action for damages). See generally Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Controls Part II, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10063, 10079-80 (1984) (discussing
penalties).
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a substantive regulatory statute against a nonfederal defendant.20
But against a federal party, a private right of action may be superflu-
ous to the extent that the factual situation provides an opportunity
for judicial review. In a suit against a federal party, however, there
is an opportunity for conceptual overlap between a private right for
enforcement and an action seeking judicial review, which may make
it difficult to determine under which theory a particular case should
be approached. For example, a federal agency could engage in
rulemaking that could be challenged under a theory of judicial re-
view, or it could be sued as a polluter in an action for abatement
under a citizen suit provision.2' Cases involving allegations of ad-
ministrative inaction against a federal party may involve additional
analytical difficulty.22
II
THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA V. SIERRA CLUB AND
SEA CLAMMERS
The Supreme Court's treatment of the private rights issue in
California v. Sierra Club and Sea Clammers is of principal importance in
discussing causes of action under federal environmental statutes.
20 In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that a
plaintiff could maintain suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) based solely on a violation of
a federal statute. A Thiboutot action, by definition, is commenced against an official act-
ing under color of state law. This kind of action in the environmental field would best
serve to enforce a statute or regulations promulgated under it against violations by a
state or municipal authority. For these reasons, Thiboutot cases under the environmental
laws are similar to citizen suits seeking enforcement. See supra note 8. This Article will
treat such cases as a type of private right of action. See Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct.
3457, 3466-67 (1984) (characterizing Thiboutot cases as a form of private right of action).
See generally Sunstein, supra note 11, at 427 (characterizing Thiboutot suits as based on
private causes of action, but suggesting some similarity to APA review). Cf Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)
does not create substantive rights).
21 Several of the environmental statutes apply to federal facilities. E.g., Federal
Water Pollution Control Act § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982); Clean Air Act § 118, 42
U.S.C. § 7418 (1982). The citizen suit provisions of those statutes create causes of ac-
tion for abatement of pollution from federal sources. See, e.g., South Carolina Wildlife
Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118 (D.S.C. 1978) (Federal Water Pollution Control
Act); California v. Department of the Navy, 9 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2077 (N.D. Cal.
1977) (Clean Air Act). See also S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-39, reprinted in
relevant part in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 724 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) ("Since Federal agencies have been notoriously laggard in abating pollution
. . . it is important to provide that citizens can seek, through the courts, to expedite the
government performance specifically directed under section 118 [of the Clean Air
Act].").
22 See supra note 8 (action seeking mandatory injunction as form ofjudicial review).
Cf. Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (ad-
ministrative inaction equivalent to agency order for purposes of judicial review). See
generally Note, supra note 12 (arguing that doctrinal barriers to judicial review of agency
inaction should be removed).
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The Court's opinions, however, contain somewhat abbreviated
statements of facts and telescoped histories of the cases. Because
the Supreme Court did not discuss important elements of the two
cases from the point of view of the present analysis, this Article
briefly sets out their history in the following sections.
A. California v. Sierra Club
In California v. Sierra Club, 23 two individuals and an environmen-
tal group sought to enjoin construction and operation of a joint
water diversion project in California. Plaintiffs named both federal
and state officials as defendants, alleging a violation of section 10 of
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.24 The district
court recognized an implied private right of action to enforce sec-
tion 10, and further concluded that the permits issued to build the
project were insufficient under section 10 to grant administrative
authorization for the entire project.25 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's conclusion that a private right of action
exists under section 10.26 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that a private right of action does not exist under section 10.27
The primary question in the Supreme Court was whether a pri-
vate right of action exists under section 10, and, if so, whether addi-
tional section 10 permits were necessary to proceed with the
project. Because the Court had granted certiorari only to state and
municipal defendants, 28 it was not called upon to address the ques-
23 451 U.S. 287 (1981), rev'g Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979).
24 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982). See 400 F. Supp. at 620. Section 10 provides that absent
affirmative authorization by Congress, construction that hinders navigation on the na-
tion's waters must be recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army.
25 400 F. Supp. at 635.
26 610 F.2d at 587-92. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the district court in
part on the ground that portions of the project had been affirmatively authorized by
Congress. Id. at 600-05.
27 451 U.S. at 298. The Supreme Court focused on the first two factors of the
approach in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (discussed supra note 11) to ascertain the
existence of an implied private right of action under the statute. The Court decided that
the statute was not intended to benefit the plaintiffs in that case particularly, but rather
was intended to benefit the public at large. 451 U.S. at 293-98.
28 The state defendants and the intervenor-defendant public water agencies, but
not the federal defendants, petitioned for certiorari. See 449 U.S. 818 (1980) (order
granting petitions for certiorari). The federal defendants appeared before the Supreme
Court as respondents. Sup. CT. RuLE 19.6. See 451 U.S. at 288.
In their brief in the Supreme Court, the federal defendants expressed concern pri-
marily over the incidental effect on the federal government if the Court recognized a
private cause of action against the state defendants. In the event of such a holding,
claimed the federal defendants, "the [Army] Corps [of Engineers] is effectively required
by district court orders to process permit applications relating to activities that, in the
view of the Corps, have an insignificant effect on navigable waters." Brief for Federal
Respondents at 23 n. 15, Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287. Plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari on
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tion whether the case involved reviewable agency action. Conse-
quently, the applicability of the APA was not discussed.
29
Accordingly, the Court properly held that the California v. Sierra Club
plaintiffs had to establish the existence of a private right of action to
maintain their suit against the state defendants. 30 This holding
should not, however, be construed as authority for dismissing a
cause of action for judicial review against the federal government or
one of its agencies or officials when the facts present an opportunity
forjudicial review and the plaintiffs rely on the APA or other author-
ity for judicial review. 3' Unfortunately, some cases have interpreted
the Supreme Court's opinion to preclude judicial scrutiny of other-
wise reviewable agency action.
3 2
B. Sea Clammers
In Sea Clammers,33 a fishermen's organization and an individual
sued federal and municipal defendants, alleging that sewage and
other waste discharged into the New York Harbor, the Hudson
River, and the Atlantic Ocean had adverse effects on commercially
valuable fisheries. The complaint alleged causes of action for dam-
ages and for declaratory and injunctive relief based in part on the
citizen suit provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
an unrelated issue. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 451 U.S. 965 (1981) (order granting certio-
rari, vacating judgment, and remanding for further consideration in light of California v.
Sierra Club).
29 Although the plaintiffs relied on the APA for jurisdictional purposes, see Com-
plaint 1, Sierra Club, 400 F. Supp. 610, they did not rely on the APA for their claim
under the Rivers and Harbors Authorization Act. See id. 1 38-48. Further, the plaintiffs
did not plead the APA specifically in any of their other claims for relief. See id. 49-
101. None of the opinions in the case discussed the relevance of the APA.
30 Both the district court, see 400 F. Supp. at 625 n.16, and the court of appeals, see
610 F.2d at 588, 590 n.15, apparently believed that a private right of action was neces-
sary for plaintiffs to maintain their suit against the federal defendants. The Supreme
Court did not explicitly address the necessity for a private right of action against the
federal, as distinguished from the state, defendants as a prerequisite to plaintiffs' main-
taining suit against the federal defendants.
31 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 317-18 (1979); Seafarers Int'l Union
v. United States Coast Guard, 736 F.2d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1984); California v. Watt, 683
F.2d 1253, 1270 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Secretary of the Interior v.
California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984); Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882, 885 (9th
Cir. 1981); Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Costle, 662 F.2d 45, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
32 E.g., Sierra Club v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1033-34 (2d Cir. 1983)
(relying on California v. Sierra Club in dismissing APA action for review of federal defend-
ant's decision to grant permit under § 10 of Rivers and Harbors Authorization Act); cf
Faust v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 721 F.2d 934, 939 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2678 (1984) (citing California v. Sierra Club for proposition that issuance
of permits under Rivers and Harbors Authorization Act is unreviewable discretionary
function).
33 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981), rev'g National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1980).
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(FWPCA)3 4 and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972 (MPRSA).35 The district court held that the plaintiffs'
failure to give the notice required by both citizen suit provisions
before commencing suit was a jurisdictional bar to their FWPCA
and MPRSA actions and granted summary judgment to defend-
ants.36 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' causes of action based on the FWPCA and the
MPRSA. The Third Circuit found that implied rights of action exist
under the FWPCA and the MPRSA, holding that the "savings"
clauses in the citizen suit provisions of both statutes preserved those
implied private rights of action, notwithstanding the defect in no-
tice.37 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, conclud-
ing that no implied private rights of action exist under either
statute.38 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend an im-
plied private right of action because it made the two statutory
schemes particularly comprehensive, incorporating public enforce-
ment mechanisms and provisions for judicial review in addition to
the citizen suit provisions.3 9 The Court also found that Congress
did not intend to preserve rights of action under the statutes
themselves.40
Noncompliance with the prescribed notice provisions forced
34 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FWPCA].
35 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MPRSA].
36 National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1122-24.
37 616 F.2d at 1228-32. The savings clause of the FWPCA citizen suit provision
states: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." FWPCA § 505(e), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e) (1982). The savings clause of the MPRSA citizen suit provision states: "The
injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of
any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." MPRSA § 105(g)(5), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(g)(5) (1982). The court of appeals also held that plaintiffs had a cause of action
based on the federal common law of nuisance, reversing the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' claim based on that theory. 616 F.2d at 1233-35.
38 453 U.S. at 13-21. The Supreme Court construed the opinion of the court of
appeals as acknowledging the existence of an action for damages under the FWPCA and
the MPRSA against the federal defendants. Id. at 9 & n.14.
39 The Court ascribed particular importance to the FWPCA's judicial review provi-
sion. 453 U.S. at 17. However, it also glossed over one difference between the two
statutes. The MPRSA, in contrast to the FWPCA, does not contain its own provision for
judicial review. See infra note 53.
The Court also reversed the court of appeals on the federal common law of nui-
sance issue, concluding that the FWPCA preempted the federal common law of nuisance
in the area of water pollution. 453 U.S. at 21-22. In addition, the Court concluded that
the comprehensive character of the FWPCA and MPRSA statutory schemes precluded a
Thiboutot action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) against the nonfederal defendants under
those statutes. 453 U.S. at 19-21. See supra note 20.
40 453 U.S. at 15-16 & n.26.
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the plaintiffs in Sea Clammers to try to establish the existence of an
implied private cause of action under the FWPCA and the MPRSA
to maintain their suit against the municipal defendants. Against the
federal defendants, however, plaintiffs could have proceeded under
the theory of judicial review unless the actions complained of were
not reviewable 41 or the relief sought, such as money damages, was
unavailable.42 As in California v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court did
not address the applicability of the APA. 4 3 Accordingly, neither
case is authority for precluding judicial review of federal administra-
tive action simply because there is no private right of action.44
Some cases, however, have adopted a different interpretation. 45
III
ACTIONS AGAINST FEDERAL PARTIES
As discussed in this Article, the main area of potential analytical
overlap between the concepts ofjudicial review and private rights of
action arises in cases against a federal party. Against all other de-
fendants, a private right of action is necessary to maintain a suit al-
41 Discharges of the type complained of in Sea Clammers are probably not reviewable
under the FWPCA § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1982) (providing for appellate review
of various administrative actions including standards of performance, determinations,
effluent standards, prohibitions, pretreatment standards, determinations as to state per-
mit programs, effluent limitations, and permits). See City of Baton Rouge v. EPA, 620
F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1980) (courts of appeals "lack power to review actions of the
EPA over which § 1369(b)(1) does not specifically grant review").
Likewise, allowing these discharges probably is not reviewable agency action within
the meaning of APA § 4(b)(13), 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982) (" 'agency action' includes
• . . an agency. . . license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or fail-
ure to act"). A portion of plaintiffs' 13-count complaint, however, may have alleged
causes of action that fairly could be characterized as based on a theory ofjudicial review.
See Complaint 55(a) & 59(a) (alleging that federal defendants had failed to promul-
gate regulations as required by MPRSA and FWPCA), National Sea Clammers Ass'n v.
City of New York, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1118 (D.NJ. 1978). Seegenerally supra notes
8 & 14 (mandamus as form ofjudicial review).
42 See, e.g., APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) (waiving sovereign immunity in suit
for judicial review seeking other than money damages).
43 The district court discussed the APA only as it related to jurisdiction, 12 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1119 n.5, and to a claim based on the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982), 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1124, 1127. The
Third Circuit made a passing reference to the APA in the latter context, 616 F.2d at
1237, and in discussing standing, id. at 1226 n.5, and sovereign immunity, id. at 1231
n.22. The Supreme Court's opinion, which did not discuss the National Environmental
Policy Act issue, did not mention the APA at all. Unlike California v. Sierra Club, the
federal defendants in Sea Clammers petitioned for and were granted certiorari. See 453
U.S. at 10.
44 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
45 See Howard v. Pierce, 738 F.2d 722, 723 n.2, 724-31 (6th Cir. 1984) (relying on
Sea Clammers and California v. Sierra Club in implying private cause of action for injunctive
and declaratory relief, notwithstanding plaintiffs and federal defendant's assertion that
adequate relief available under APA). See also cases cited at supra note 32.
414 [Vol. 70:403
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
leging violations of a federal regulatory statute. Against a federal
party, however, a private right may be unnecessary to the extent the
factual situation presents a case amenable to resolution by judicial
review.
A plaintiff may allege both a private right of action and a cause
of action for judicial review against a federal defendant. If the fed-
eral defendant tries to dismiss the suit because a private right of
action does not exist, the court initially should decide whether judi-
cial review is available. Only after the court concludes that a cause
of action for judicial review based on the facts is lacking, or that the
relief requested cannot be granted under a theory ofjudicial review,
should the court turn to the question whether a private right of ac-
tion exists.
Three examples illustrate this approach. First, assume that a
federal facility is violating the terms of a discharge permit issued
pursuant to the FWPCA.46 This activity probably could not be chal-
lenged in a proceeding for judicial review, because it is not a review-
able action under the judicial review provision of the FWPCA nor is
it "agency action" under the APA.47 A private party could, how-
ever, bring suit under the FWPCA's citizen suit provision to enjoin
further violations. Because no cause of action for review is avail-
able, a private right of action, in this case expressly created by Con-
gress in the citizen suit provision, is necessary for a private party to
maintain suit against the federal defendant.48
A second example is that of a federal facility that is misusing a
pesticide in violation of requirements promulgated under the au-
thority of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).49 As in the first example, this activity probably is not re-
viewable under either FIFRA's judicial review provision 50 or the
APA. Unlike the FWPCA, however, FIFRA contains no citizen
suit provision, and there is no known implied private right of action
for FIFRA's enforcement. 51  The result is that a citizen plaintiff
46 See FWPCA § 313, 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1982) (FWPCA provisions apply to federal
facilities unless specifically exempted by President). See generally id. § 402, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342 (1982) (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System).
47 See supra note 41.
48 Cf Davis v. United States, 722 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2151 (1984)" (no cause of action against United States for damages under Federal Tort
Claims Act for violation of FWPCA).
49 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982) [hereinafter cited as FIFRA].
50 FIFRA § 16, 7 U.S.C. § 136n (1982) (providing for review in courts of appeals of
agency orders following public hearings and review in district courts of EPA refusals to
cancel or suspend registration or change classifications without hearing).
51 See Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77 (9th Cir. 1983) (no private right of action under
FIFRA).
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probably cannot challenge this kind of violation even if committed
by a federal party.
Yet a third example is a challenge under the APA to the ade-
quacy of a permit issued by a federal party under section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Authorization Act. As discussed above, this fact
situation is entirely different from California v. Sierra Club, in which
the Supreme Court concluded that there was no private right of ac-
tion to enforce section 10 against nonfederal parties. In this exam-
ple, however, the issuance of a section 10 permit is clearly final
agency action under the APA and reviewable in a suit naming the
federal party as defendant. Because of the existence of an adequate
remedy under a theory of judicial review, the question of the exist-
ence of a private right of action would not have to be addressed.
52
In the first two examples, courts will treat a federal party as they
would any private violator. This result is the equivalent of a conclu-
sion that a private right of action is necessary for the suit to proceed.
When, however, facts are alleged that present an opportunity for
judicial review under appropriate authority, as in the third example,
there is no analogy between the federal government and a private
party defendant. Judicial review of government action involves a
conceptually distinct proceeding, the availability of which is in-
dependent of the presence or absence of a private right of action.5 3
CONCLUSION
Judicial review in the federal courts is an indispensable mecha-
nism for challenging arbitrary or unlawful government action.
Although private rights of action for enforcing substantive regula-
tory statutes may generate incidental public benefits, those actions
are no substitute for judicial review of administrative action.54 Judi-
cial review provides a valuable opportunity for citizen input into the
decisionmaking process of the unelected bureaucracies. Recogniz-
ing the significance ofjudicial review of administrative action to the
healthy functioning of our democratic processes, courts generally
52 But see Sierra Club v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1033 (2d Cir. 1983)
(relying on California v. Sierra Club to preclude review of issuance of § 10 permit).
53 Because of the presumption of reviewability, see supra note 16 and accompanying
text, an analysis of the type undertaken in Sea Clammers, in which the Court concluded
that the statutory schemes at issue were intended to preclude other forms of action,
could not without more suffice to support a holding that review is precluded under a
substantive regulatory statute lacking a special judicial review provision. It is interesting
that the MPRSA, which was a subject of the opinion in Sea Clammers, is an example of
such a statute.
54 Cf. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part I, 13 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10309, 10320 (1983) (citizen suit provisions "are not substitutes
for the judicial review sections of the various [pollution control) statutes" (citing pre-
California v. Sierra Club cases)).
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articulate a presumption of reviewability. A private right of action
under a regulatory statute-an analytically distinct proceeding for
enforcement of regulatory standards-is irrelevant to a proceeding
for judicial review against a federal party challenging administrative
action under that statute. Accordingly, neither the presence nor ab-
sence of a private right of action should be a factor sufficient to
overcome the presumption favoring access to judicial review. The
two types of suits should continue to remain distinct in the minds of
both judges and litigants.
